MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director of Intelligence

FROM: Executive Assistant to the DDCI

Executive Registry

85-4302

Dick,

DDCI would be interested in your comments on paragraph 7 of Congressman Hamilton's remarks.

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Date 1 November 1985

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INTELLIGENCE

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 30, 1985

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert my Washington Report for Wednesday, October 30, 1985, into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

INTELLIGENCE

In the arsenals of governments, no weapon exceeds intelligence in importance. Being secret, it is also the least understood. The questions and answers that follow may help in understanding what intelligence is all about.

1. What is intelligence?

Intelligence is generally considered the secret collection of information not publicly available, analysis of the information, and supplying it to policymakers. The main tasks of intelligence are to assess present actions of governments or groups, such as terrorists, and to determine their intentions.

2. Who uses intelligence?

Although top officials—the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—use intelligence, most of it also goes to many lower level officials, much of it to support military plans, operations and weapons systems development.

3. How is the intelligence community organized?

The intelligence community is not rigidly organized. It includes: the Central Intelligence Agency, which is responsible for human intelligence collection and analysis; the National Security Agency, which collects foreign communications intelligence; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which analyzes intelligence gathered by other agencies for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the FBI, the domestic counterintelligence agency; the intelligence departments of the armed services; and other agencies, units and groups. There is no single head of all U.S. intelligence activity, although the Director of Central Intelligence is our preeminent intelligence official.

4. What do we ask intelligence to do?

Our government needs an enormous amount of information to protect our national security and carry out U.S. foreign policy. After World War II, most of our intelligence activity concerned the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of China, and North Korea. Today, intelligence also includes international terrorism, narcotics trade, third world debt, Soviet grain purchases and other topics. The stability and intentions of almost every government in the world interest us. Intelligence can help avert a crisis, as in the Soviet attempt to install missiles in Cuba. It can help verify arms control agreement compliance.

5. What are covert actions?

Covert actions are secret attempts to influence people, events and nations in support of U.S. foreign policy. They are not meant to be attributed to the U.S. and should aid, rather than replace, foreign policy. Covert actions include: propaganda, for example, keeping the world informed of Soviet misdeeds; political action, such as our support of anti-communist parties in the West after World War II; and paramilitary operations like the war in Laos during the 1960s. Unless the President directs otherwise, the CIA conducts these operations. Covert actions allow us to support foreign political leaders without exposing them to charg

to compete with the Soviets in the Third World without creating open confrontations. They also give the President an option besides diplomacy and military force to implement foreign policy. Drawbacks of covert actions include the risk of embarrassment and criticism of the U.S., if disclosed, and diverting the CIA from its main task of intelligence collection and analysis.

6. What is Congress' role in overseeing covert actions?

The President informs Congress of each covert action. He does not need congressional approval. If Congress dislikes an action, its only recourse is to deny funding, as it did with Nicaragua. The Congress reviews the authority, goals, means and timetable of covert actions on a regular basis.

7. How good is our intelligence?

Our intelligence is generally good, but it could be improved. We do not have enough information about the Soviet Union. Our estimates of Soviet oil production in 1977 were wrong, and estimates of Soviet military spending have been inconsistent. Our lack of understanding of political dynamics in the Soviet Union hampers our ability to react to Soviet behavior. We know too little about the Middle East and Central America, and about terrorism. U.S. intelligence has had notable successes. Our information in Vietnam was consistently accurate. We have learned a great deal about Soviet military capabilities. U.S. intelligence described the real impact of sanctions on the Soviet gas pipeline.

8. How can we improve our intelligence?

We should give it higher priority. Countries that believe their existence depends on it have good intelligence. We should also depoliticize intelligence. Intelligence is often used to make policy look good rather than to develop policy. We should separate analysis from policy, although effective analysts need to be aware of the policy. Dissenting views can be stifled by the search for consensus, so we should encourage competing intelligence estimates. Through the budget process, congressional oversight can improve intelligence, chiefly by asking the right question: Does the right person get information on time? Does funding a request mean the eventual acceptance of others? Is a system cost effective? Does the budget support arms control monitoring? Congress must apply common sense to intelligence activity that affects our foreign policy.

9. How important is intelligence?

Good intelligence is essential to our security. We must cast aside romantic ideas about spy thrillers and get down to the hard, detailed work of improving intelligence so that we have the best available information for making decisions.

PORTUGAL'S DEMOCRACY

C-119

HON. TONY COELHO

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 30, 1985

Mr. COELHO. Mr. Speaker, as the Christian Science Monitor editorialized recently, the "results of Portugal's newest election are an affirmation of democracy and a vote for continuity."

As a Portuguese American, I am proud of the election results. Portugal's experience with democracy is only 11 years old, and severe economic hardships confront the Portuguese people; still, they went to the polls and expressed confidence in their free society and democratic form of Govern-

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